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Abstract—  This  paper  examines  the  role  of  market 
coordination  and  market  distortions  caused  by  a 
hypothetical FMD outbreak in the Finnish pig sector. By 
using stochastic dynamic programming, it simulates the 
consequences of two outbreak scenarios (large vs. small) 
under two distinct market regimes (competitive market 
vs. monopoly in the domestic supply). Simulated losses 
depend  on  the  magnitude  of  outbreak  and  expected 
duration of possible turndown of meat exports, whereas 
market regime has a limited impact. 
Keywords—  Foreign  trade,  livestock  epidemics, 
dynamic programming. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Highly contagious diseases such as classical swine 
fever,  foot-and-mouth  disease  (FMD)  or  high-
pathogenic  avian  influenza  can  have  devastating 
impact on food production and economy of rural areas 
in the infected country e.g. [5], [8], [9]. These diseases 
need  to  be  notified  to  the  World  Organization  for 
Animal Health (OIE), they can spread rapidly, threat 
animal  welfare  and  health,  and  distort  international 
trade.  
FMD outbreak typically removes animals from the 
market,  closes  down  export  markets  and  possibly 
reduces domestic demand for animal products. If trade 
restrictions  take  place,  producers  in  export-oriented 
countries can be hit especially badly. There can also 
be considerable uncertainty and variation in outcomes.  
The  importance  of  market  structure  is  well 
recognized.  It  is  considered  harmful  to  society  if  a 
company has too dominant market position. Retailing 
is, nevertheless, quite concentrated in many countries 
and meat processing can also be well coordinated. For 
instance,  two  companies  buy  about  85%  and  four 
companies almost 99% of pigs fattened in Finland. 
Regarding livestock epidemics, producers can have 
the opportunity to reduce losses through coordinated 
actions,  for  instance,  when  exports  are  halted  or 
disease  removes  a  lot  of  animals  from  the  market. 
During  the  2001  FMD  epidemic  in  the  United 
Kingdom, the gap between farm gate and consumer 
prices of beef increased [10]. The study argues that 
producer  prices  can  fall  and  marketing  margins  of 
retailing  and  processing  can  increase  during  an 
epidemic due to changes in hygiene costs and meat 
demand  even  if  market  power  was  not  misused.  As 
exploiting market power can increase this margin, it is 
important that markets function properly. 
The goal of this paper is to simulate consequences 
of hypothetical FMD outbreak in the Finnish pig meat 
market. The analysis is carried out with a stochastic 
dynamic  programming  model  for  the  Finnish  pig 
sector. The model takes into account implications of 
herd  dynamics,  biological  time  lags  and  adjustment 
costs, which incur when pigs are unexpectedly lost or 
exports halted. The market system focuses only on pig 
sector, which is segregated from beef and milk sectors. 
We analyze two scenarios under two distinct market 
regimes. Outbreaks differ in magnitude, but they both 
prevent the exporting of pig products temporarily. The 
magnitude of outbreak is exogenous and its duration is 
unknown  in  advance.  The  objective  function 
maximises  either  producer  profits  only  (regime: 
“monopoly”  in  the  domestic  supply,  but  producers 
compete with import demand) or the sum of producer 
profits  and  consumer  surplus  (regime:  “competitive 
market”). Calibrated meat quantities are assumed to be 
the  same  under  both  regimes.  In  other  words, 
producer’s opportunity costs differer between regimes. 
We thus examine whether it matters if analyst makes 
faulty  assumptions  about  the  market  structure,  i.e. 
“what if the market actually is a monopoly, but there is 
a difference in the opportunity cost?”    2 
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II. A DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING MODEL  
A. Value functions 
The model simulates the impact of FMD outbreak 
to  producers  (incl.  primary  production  and 
slaughtering)  and  consumers  (incl.  meat  processing, 
retailing and final consumers in Finland) as a group on 
a monthly basis. Demand and supply models with an 
epidemiological  scenario  jointly  characterise  pig 
markets (Figure 1). The model characterises derived 
demand for pig meat with four equations:  
1.  Domestic demand for Finnish pig meat,  
2.  The quantity of Finnish pig meat exported to the 
EU,  
3.  The quantity of Finnish pig meat exported to non-
EU countries, and  
4.  The quantity of pig meat imported into Finland.  
Demand  equations  implicitly  include  the  storing  of 
meat. Imports and exports of live pigs are considered 
negligible.  Demand  equations  are  specified  using 
logarithmic  transformations  of  variables.  The  most 
interesting  variable  explaining  meat  quantities  is 
elasticity estimate, which establishes the link between 
meat price 
i
t P  and meat quantity 
i
t D .  
The model takes into account the utility-maximising 
behaviour  of  producers  and  consumers.  Our 
specification  implies  that  production  is  coordinated, 
i.e.  supply  emanating  from  previous  production 
decisions  is  known  and  agents  as  a  group  can 
minimise  losses  due  to  epidemic.  Short-run  supply 
adjustments constitute a partial optimisation problem 
conditioned by the number of pigs currently kept at 
farms and adjustment options such as slaughter weight 
and  storing.  In  the  long  run,  producers  can  control 
supply also by adjusting the sow stock. 
Domestic  supply  monopoly  pricing  (Equation  1) 
includes area below inverse demand curve only up to 
the  market  value  of  pig  meat,  whereas  competitive 
domestic supply behaviour (Equation 2) includes all 
area. Objective function for the monopoly case is:  
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where  ) ( t x t V   is  the  maximised  value  of  pig 
production sector in Finland; t is time index (months); 
t x  is the state vector, which contains information on 
the number of sows farrowing in Finland, the number 
of  pigs  in  Finland, and the  share  of  export  markets 
closed  at  period  t;  t u   is  the  control  vector  which 
contains  the  numbers  of  piglets  allocated  to 
reproduction  and  slaughter,  and  slaughter  weight; 
( ) t t u , x t S   is  pig  meat  supply;  ) (
prod
t t u , x t P is 
producer price of pig meat;  ) ( t t u , x t C  is production 
cost  incurred  at  period  t;  β   is  the  discount  factor; 
) (• E is expectations operator; T is the terminal period; 
and  ) , ( t t u x g   is  the  transition  equation,  which 
characterises  animal  stock  dynamics  and  stochastic 
jump  process  for  the  continuation  of  export 
distortions.  Dynamics  imply  that  an  insemination 
shows up as pigs sold to slaughter 10 months later.  
The objective for the competitive market pricing is: 
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where  ) ( t x t W   is  the  value  of  Finnish  pig  market; 
) , , (
dom dom
t t Q P t t u x  and  ) , , (
imp imp
t t Q P t t u x are inverse 
demand  functions  for  domestic  and  import  demand, 
respectively, used to integrate area below the demand 
curve from q to 
dom
t D  or 
imp
t D ;  ) , , (
EU EU
t t Q P t t u x  and 
) , , (
row row
t t Q P t t u x  are export prices at EU and non-EU 
markets as functions of export distortion, meat storing 
and quantity 
EU
t Q  or 
row
t Q  exported to EU or non-EU 
market; and  ) (
*
t t u , x t C  is production cost.    3 
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Fig. 1 Price signals (broken line), good flows (solid line) 
and the segmentation of markets in the simulated market, 
where epidemic scenario directly affects supply and sow 
stock, and export scenario directly affects exports. 
Aggregate  demand  for  Finnish  pig  meat  is 
conditioned to meet the supply of Finnish pig meat at 
the  same  period.  Prices  adjust  along  the  demand 
curves,  except  when  exports  are  halted  and  export 
demand  shifts  due  to  FMD.  Furthermore,  after 
subtracting  transaction  costs  and  constant  margins, 
Finnish pig meat has the same price at domestic and 
export markets. Simulated price system also takes into 
account contractual frictions which may induce stable 
meat prices in the very short-run. 
B. Data and outbreak scenarios 
Monthly data regarding Finnish pig meat markets 
were obtained from the statistics of Information Centre 
of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Statistics 
Finland, except data about imports and exports of pig 
meat, which were retrieved from the Eurostat website.  
Instantaneous  returns  at  each  period  are  income 
from selling meat to slaughter minus the production 
cost of a batch of piglets with existing sows and gilts, 
the cost of producing gilts from piglets, the cost of 
fattening pigs to slaughter, and slaughter costs. There 
are  adjustment  costs  which  make  it  costly  for  a 
producer to keep production capacity idle, expand sow 
stock  or  adjust  slaughter weights.  Slaughter  weights 
vary only limitedly. Production costs in pig fattening 
were  simulated  using  production  functions  [6]  and 
other data on the costs of primary production [7].  
Epidemiological scenarios used in the analysis were 
based on a separate epidemiological simulation study 
[4]. The scenarios were selected from set of 900 000 
simulated  epidemics,  which  were  started  from  each 
Finnish pig farm in its turn. These simulations suggest 
that epidemics originating from ‘high-risk farms’ can 
be  very  different  in  size  than  disease  outbreaks 
originating from ‘medium-risk farms’ (Table 1).  
Table 1 Epidemic scenarios for median and high-risk farms. 
Characteristic  Median-risk  High-risk 
Number of infected farms  4  20 
Number of removed sows  270  3539 
Number of removed fattening pigs  1629  14372 
Farms in restriction zones  62  380 
Sows in restriction zones  3536  28213 
Fattening pigs in restriction zones  23557  125711 
Expected duration of export shock  4  5 
  
C. Estimation method 
Four  demand  equations  were  first  estimated  with 
three-stage  least  squares  procedure  [3].  Structural-
form  optimization  problems  were  then  solved 
numerically  with  dynamic  programming  [1].  Price, 
demand  and  production  levels  were  calibrated  to 
average  monthly  markets  in  2006  by  adjusting 
opportunity cost of capital and constants in equations. 
At  calibrated  quantities,  the  difference  in  capacity 
costs between two market regimes was 3.49 eurocents 
per  kg.  Finally,  the  effects  of  disease  shocks  were 
obtained by comparing simulated scenarios. 
III. RESULTS  
In  the  econometric  estimation,  statistically  best 
performance was obtained for specification in which 
price elasticity of demand with respect to Finnish pig 
meat price was -0.14 for domestic demand, 0.87 for 
import demand, and -0.51 for export demand to non-
EU and -0.97 for export demand to EU destinations.  
Table  2  illustrates  income  losses  for  simulated 
scenarios. Results show that consumers generally gain 
and producer loose welfare due to the export shock 
and  disease  outbreak.  When  export  shock  duration 
increases, temporary storing capacity is quickly used 
up  and  excess  meat  supply  in  domestic  markets 
increases. Producers can therefore suffer quite a lot in 
both  disease  scenarios.  Losses  in  the  median-farm   4 
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scenario for instance are about 8% of market value of 
annual meat production. 
Simulated prices fall due to excess supply during 
the export demand shock. The cost of an export shock 
increases with its duration. Benefits to producers from 
reducing  slaughter  weights  are  slightly  higher  in 
monopoly than competitive market regime. However, 
the benefits to producers from lower slaughter weights 
are small as few other costs can be decreased in the 
short run and quite large decrease in production would 
be  required  to  recover  prices  during  the  outbreak. 
Thus, slaughter weights decrease very little.  
Production  adjustment  takes  primarily  place 
through  adjusting  animal  stock.  Since  culling  sows 
prematurely  is  considered  costly  and  irreversible 
decision, producers reduce insemination rates when an 
outbreak occurs. The reduction in insemination is the 
stronger the longer export restrictions are expected to 
last  (the  duration  is  stochastic).  Outbreak  size  has 
smaller impact on the number of inseminated pigs than 
the duration of export restrictions has. 
Overall, the impact  of an  outbreak  on  production 
quantity 10 months after introducing the market shock 
is  generally  less  than  1%.  Differences  in  market 
adjustment  between  domestic  supply  monopoly  and 
competitive  domestic  monopoly  cases,  during  the 
export  shock,  are  quite  small,  although  competitive 
domestic supply faces stronger domestic and import 
competition  than  domestic  monopoly.  However, 
monopoly  regime  provides  incentives  to  adjust 
production  more  strongly  than  competitive  domestic 
supply particularly in the high-risk farm scenario and 
when export shock ends sooner than expected. 
Market regime has smaller impact on the producer 
welfare  than  that  of  consumers.  Producers  seem  to 
suffer slightly higher losses in our simulations under 
monopoly  regime  than  under  competitive  market 
regime. This result is due to different opportunity costs 
assumed  in  the  monopoly  case  than  in  competitive 
market case. However, the result suggests that market 
regime may have larger impacts on consumer welfare 
than on producer welfare in the case of FMD outbreak. 
Consumers  can  benefit  when  prices  fall.  The 
benefits  to  consumers  are  larger  under  competitive 
market regime than monopoly regime. Small impact 
on consumers is linked to short-term market frictions. 
It is also due to the estimation results, which induce 
that  price  changes  decrease  import  supply  quite 
elastically, whereas domestic supply is very inelastic. 
Thus, when an outbreak occurs, vast amount of excess 
meat enters domestic markets, meat prices fall and the 
utility  gained  from  (more  elastic)  import  demand 
decreases.  Consumers  therefore  gain  relatively  little 
from  disease  outbreak  despite  increasing  the 
consumption  of  domestic  pig  meat  because  utility 
from import consumption simultaneously decreases. 
Table 2. Economic impacts (€ million per outbreak to 
consumers*, producers*, public funds and total loss) under 
monopoly and competitive market regimes and for 
epidemics starting from a median-risk or a high-risk farm. 
Scenario  Consumer   Producer   Public 
funds  Total  
Median-farm          
Competitive   5,5  -21,7  -0,6  -16,8 
Monopoly    2,3  -22,2  -0,6  -20,5 
High-risk farm         
Competitive   3,6  -24,4  -6,5  -27,3 
Monopoly   -0,5  -25,1  -6,5  -32,0 
*Producers  include  pig  producers  and  slaughterhouses, 
but not meat processing. Producers are compensated for the 
value of lost animals. Consumers include final consumer, 
meat processing and retailing. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS  
Results raise two major conclusions. Firstly, market 
power can increase the adjustment of production, but 
market  power  can  have  only  a  limited  impact  on 
producer’s disease losses due to import competition, 
especially  if  import  demand  is  relatively  elastic. 
However, welfare gain to consumers from the export 
closure and low prices may be lower in the case of 
domestic  monopoly  than  in  the  case  of  competitive 
markets. Effects to consumers largely depend on the 
direct  impact  of  disease  on  supply  and  producer 
incentives to decrease production during and after an 
outbreak.  Secondly,  high-risk  farms  require  more 
attention from the risk management point of view than 
median-risk farms.  
An agent who has monopoly power can exploit his 
status  in  order  to  minimize  the  market  losses  by 
responding  more  strongly  to  the  number  of  lost 
animals, and possibly increase exports more strongly   5 
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after the export closure than an agent in competitive 
markets.  Monopoly  can  also  reduce  supply  more 
aggressively than competitive markets would do.  
The net effect of switching from one market regime 
to  another  however  depends  on  price  elasticity  of 
domestic  and  import  demand  which  influence  how 
meat  prices  and  production  costs  change  between 
regimes. For this reason our results are conditional on 
estimated  model  parameters.  When  comparing 
producer  losses  between  monopoly  and  competitive 
market  regimes,  trade-offs  between  reduced 
production  costs  and  the  ability  to  control  market 
prices in favour of producers are important. As there is 
uncertainty about demand elasticity estimates, results 
cannot  be  widely  generalised  in  a  group  of  net-
exporting  countries.  Results,  however,  support  the 
view that domestic monopolies can cause some harm 
to society in the event of animal disease outbreak.  
These results did show producers benefiting from 
an  increased  size  of  an  epidemic  [5].  Epidemics 
simulated here were reasonably “small” and exports 
were considered to be fully halted. Furthermore, the 
larger  epidemic  in  Table  1  was  expected  to  cause 
longer export shock than the smaller epidemic. Moral 
hazard problems are possible in the absence of export 
distortions  or  when  their  extended  duration  is  not 
connected to epidemic size. In such cases producers as 
a group can be better off in large epidemics of diseases 
such  as  FMD  for  which  it  is  possible  to  receive 
compensation for the value of lost animals. This may 
not  hold  for  diseases  which  costs  are  paid  by  the 
industry.  
The starting point for the larger epidemic in Table 1 
is a high-risk farm, which operates and is connected to 
other farms in a way which increases the total number 
of infected farms. Society suffers larger losses when 
disease is introduced into a high-risk farm than into a 
median-risk  farm.  Probability  of  a  farm  to  get  a 
disease  can  be  reduced  by  bio-security  measures, 
which  investment  should  be  put  more  emphasis  in 
high-risk farms than in median-risk farms. Result is 
consistent with an earlier study [2]. As producer losses 
seem less connected with epidemic size, prevention of 
the first infection is important to them. Noteworthy is 
also  that  public  expenditures  increase  more  steeply 
than the number of infected farm. This highlights the 
importance of preventive measures.  
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